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Indiana's Allowance of Punitive Damages in
Contract Actions Against Insurance Companies:
How New Is It?
Indiana courts have recently awarded punitive damages in contract actions even though the breaching party's wrongful conduct
does not fit the definition of a traditionally recognized tort.1
Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp2 involved an action by an insured against an insurer for failure to pay or attempt
to settle a claim. The Indiana Supreme Court held that punitive
damages may be assessed in contract actions when it appears that
the public interest will be served by the deterrent effect such
awards have upon future conduct of similarly situated parties.3
Since Vernon eliminated the traditional requirement of an independent tort, commentators perceive it as a significant modification of the law,4 and insurance companies perceive the allowance of
punitive damages against them as a costly decision.5
An examination of the policies underlying both the law of punitive damages and the doctrine of duress will reveal that the
Vernon rule, when applied to contract cases where an insurance
' See, e.g.,

Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180

(1976); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, Ind. App... -,
384 N.E.2d 607, 618
(1979); Jones v. Abriani, Ind. App... -,
350 N.E.2d 635, 649 (1976). Generally, punitive damages are disallowed in contract actions unless there is a finding of an independent
tort. 11 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1340 (3d ed. 1968).
2 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976). Vernon has the distinction of being one of the first
cases to unequivocally declare that punitive damages may be awarded in the absence of an
independent tort. See Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668, 681 (1975).
3 264 Ind. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.
4 Davis, Punitive Damages for Contract Breach, 21 RES GESTAF 306 (1977); Note, supra
note 2; J. Young, Guest Speaker at Indianapolis Bar Association Seminar, Recovering Punitive Damages 10 (July 13, 1978)(unpublished manuscript in Indiana University School of
Law Library); cf. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and
Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 247 n.198 (1977) (concluding that "it is too
early to speculate-as some commentators have-that decisions like Vernon, which appear
to liberalize the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract, constitute the irresistible wave of the future").
1 See, e.g., Dowd, Punitive or Extra-ContractualAwards against Insurers: The Reinsurer's Role, 28 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 281 (1978); DuBois & Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions, 40 INs. COUNSEL J. 290 (1973); Levit, Punitive Damages: Recent Developments, 1977 INS. L.J. 719; Rubin & Scheil, Punitive Damage Awards:
The Insurance Industry is Placed on Notice, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 350 (1978); Thorton &
Blaut, Bad Faith and Insurers: Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 12 FORUM 699
(1977). See notes 55-72 & accompanying text infra, for an analysis of California's imposition
of punitive damages in a situation similar to Vernon.
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company' has intentionally failed to pay or make an attempt to
settle a claim, represents no change in the law. This note will
demonstrate that existing case law recognizes and protects a special public interest in preventing oppressive breaches of certain
private contracts where a service needed by the majority of the
public is at stake. Since the insurance agreement falls into this category of contractual relationships deserving special attention, Indiana's treatment of insurance cases is nothing more than a straightforward recognition of a public policy already firmly entrenched in
the common law.
THE TRADITIONAL RULE

In cases growing out of the nonperformance of contracts, compensatory damages, intended solely to repay the plaintiff's pecuniary loss, are the traditionally accepted measure of relief.L7 The general rule, recognized throughout the United States, is that punitive
awards are not recoverable for a breach of contract in the absence
of an independent tort by the breaching party.8
The reason for the separate tort requirement can be understood
in light of the purpose of punitive damages, which is to protect and
vindicate the interests of society as a whole by punishing the
' Although, as in Vernon, punitive damages are commonly sought in insurance cases, see,
e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shuman, - Ind. App.-., 370 N.E.2d 941 (1977);
Sexton v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Ind. App. 529, 337 N.E.2d 527 (1975); Rex Ins. Co. v.
Baldwin, 163 Ind. App. 308, 323 N.E.2d 270 (1975), Indiana courts also have applied the
Vernon rule to contract actions brought by consumers against sellers, see, e.g., Hibschman
Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, - Ind. App.-, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (breach of warranty on
automobile); Jones v. Abriani, - Ind. App.-, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976) (breach of warranty
on mobile home). It is the special nature of the insurance-contract relationship, however,
which, in the context of an allowance of punitive damages for an oppressive breach of contract, deserves closer examination and which is to be the focus of this note:
The purpose and nature of life insurance contracts, and the duties which the
insurer assumes under such contracts, and the manner in which such contracts
are negotiated, impress such contracts and the relationship of the parties, even
during the negotiations, with characteristics unlike those incident to contracts
and negotiations for contracts in ordinary commercial transactions.
Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y., 70 N.D. 122, 142, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (1940).
1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 30 (9th ed. 1920); 11 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1338, at 197.
8 J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 1.35, at 84-85 (2d ed. 1978); 11
S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1340, at 209-11. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 14-3 (2d ed. 1977); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at 438-39
(1964). For example, an allowance of exemplary damages has been made where the elements
of fraud existed. Murphy Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coomer, 123 Ind. App. 709, 112 N.E.2d 589
(1953).
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wrongdoer and by deterring others from imitating him.9 Accordingly, only those wrongs intentionally committed in violation of a
duty owed to the public in general, as opposed to a duty owed to a
private party, are appropriate subjects for punitive treatment.
Torts logically fall into this category 0 since the duties of conduct
which give rise to them are imposed by law and are based primarily upon public policy, not the will or intention of the parties.11 By
contrast, contractual obligations are imposed because the conduct
of the parties manifests their intent to be bound; the duties are
owed solely to the specific individuals named in the contract,
rather than to society as a whole.1 2 Thus, in the absence of an independent tort, contract breaches have traditionally been remedied by compensatory damages only.1 3
TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS: BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
AND BREACH BY A PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

There is a group of cases, however, where punitive damages are
awarded even though there is no showing of an independent tort.
Both the breach of promise to marry' and the deliberate breach of
a contract for services by a public utility company15 fall into this
category of traditional exceptions because they contain distinct
characteristics which make them appropriate for punitive damage
treatment. The misconduct consists of a contract breach where the
9

5 A.

CORBIN,

supra note 8,

§ 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971).
10 5

§

1077, at 438; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 438-39.
" Id.; W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 92, at 613.
12 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 92, at 613. "[They] do not in general cause as much resentment or other mental and physical discomfort as do wrongs called torts and crimes." 5
A. CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1077, at 438.
13 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 438.
14 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 291 (1935); 11 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 1, at 211-12. Writes Williston:
[11n many jurisdictions, exemplary damages are allowed in certain cases. Generally, it is only in actions of tort that they are permitted, but in actions for
breach of promise to marry they are allowed if the defendant's conduct was
wanton and such as to show a total disregard of the plaintiff's feelings.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Jacoby v. Stark, 205 Ill. 34, 68 N.E. 557 (1903); Kurtz v.
Frank, 76 Ind. 594 (1881); Collidge v. Neat, 129 Mass. 146 (1880); Vanderpool v. Richardson,
52 Mich. 336, 17 N.W. 936 (1883); Drobnich v. Bach, 159 Minn. 258, 198 N.W. 669 (1924);
Chellis v. Chapman, 125 N.Y. 214, 26 N.E. 308 (1891); Thorn v. Tetrick, 93 W. Va. 455, 116
S.E. 762 (1923).
15 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 81, at 289-90; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1340, at
213.
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defendant takes advantage of a vulnerable promisee in an oppressive manner. The promisee's vulnerability must exist because of
the essential nature of the services and the uniqueness of the relationship, and the resulting harm must be longlasting and more
than merely pecuniary.
Breach of Promise to Marry
The courts justify the allowance of punitive damages in breach
of promise to marry situations by pointing out that, although the
conduct does not actually constitute an independent tort, the injury caused has much in common with a tort.1 6 Thus, while the
independent tort is not present, something more than a contract
breach is. That society has an interest in protecting its citizens
from similar harm, regardless of the absence of an independent
17
tort, is justification for the imposition of punitive damages.
Certain factors in the marriage cases provide strong policy reasons for awarding punitive damages. Although each factor alone
might not be enough to justify exemplary awards, their combination results in conduct and harm which society has an interest in
preventing. One of the most obvious elements in this aggregate is
the nature of the services promised. A marital relationship fulfills
basic needs-the need for companionship, love and security' 5 -which are common to most human beings. The fulfillment of
these needs is essential to an individual's health and indirectly to a
society's well-being. Additionally, because the relationship takes
much time to develop and because of its inherent complexity, it is
unique. If it is abruptly discontinued the injured party has no one
to turn to for immediate fulfillment of these basic needs. If the
contractual relationship contains both uniqueness and a promise to
perform services of the utmost importance to an individual's wellbeing, dependency will result. To intentionally breach such a contract for the purpose of taking advantage of the other's vulnerability so as to inflict harm which is longlasting and more than pecuni16 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 8,§ 1077, at 442; see, e.g., Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549,

549 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Brown v. Douglas, 104 Ga. App. 769, 769, 122 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1961);
Baumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 247, 124 P. 1083, 1084 (1912).
17 "In such cases, just as in the cases of tort in general, the community resentment is
greater and its satisfaction may require punishment as well as compensation." 5 A. CORBIN,
supra note 8, § 1077, at 440.
18 For a general discussion on this subject, see R. KLEMER, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (1970); L. SAXTON, THE INDIVIDUAL, MARRIAGE, AND THE FAMILY (2d ed. 1972); N.
STINNETr & J. WALTERS, RELATIONSHIPS IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY (1977).
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ary in nature 9 has been called "cruel" by Professor Arthur
Corbin20 and said to "sound in tort" by the courts. 2 ' The breach
often results in additional expenses, hardship and a certain
amount of mental suffering, such as depression, anxiety or humiliation, 22 all of which have little in common with the damages inflicted by the breach of a commercial bargain. s Such misconduct
and resulting harm falls somewhere in the gray area between contractual breach and tort. Nevertheless, in making an award of punitive damages in these cases, the courts recognize that society has
an interest in protecting its citizens from similar harm in the
future.
Breach by a Public Service Company
The other exception to the rule has appeared in many jurisdictions; it involves actions against public service companies for
wrongful failure to supply services. 2 " Again the misconduct falls
somewhere between breach of contract and tort. As in the marriage
cases, there is a contract breach, plus conduct and harm which the
public has an interest in preventing.2 5 The essential nature of the
services is an important factor. Courts explain that public service
" A broken engagement alone will not justify punitive damages. There must also be a
showing that the misconduct was wanton and such as to show a total disregard of the plaintiff's feelings. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1340, at 211-12.
10 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 440.
2' See generally cases cited note 16 supra. Such language is the same as, or strikingly
similar to, that used in the recent insurance cases awarding punitive damages, which hold
that the misconduct must be "tortious," "oppressive" or "lacking in good faith." That the
misconduct be oppressive or lacking in good faith was required in Sexton v. Meridian Mut.
Ins. Co., 166 Ind. App. 529, 533, 337 N.E.2d 527, 529 (1975), and Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin,
163 Ind. App. 308, 313-14, 323 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1975). That the misconduct be "tortious in
nature" was required in Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E.2d
173, 180 (1976).
22 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 441; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 111, at 398.
23 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 442. It is no wonder the injuries have been classi-

fied as those similar to harms commonly labeled as torts.
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 81, at 289-90; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1340, at
213.
25 See, e.g., Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (1701), a case involving liability of a postmaster general for property which was lost in the mail, in which Chief Justice Holt said:
If on the road a shoe fall off my horse, and I come to a smith to have one put
on, and the smith refuse to do it, an action will lie against him, because he has
made profession of a trade which is for the public good, and has thereby exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the King's subjects that will employ him in the way of this trade.
Id. at 1464.
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company breaches are treated as exceptions to the general rule because they provide services or commodities, such as water,26 telephone service,2 7 electricity and heat, 28 transportation, 29 and other
public services ° which fulfill basic needs of most individuals: "The
telephone may be considered a necessary household utility, so
much so that the thought of losing it will coerce almost any one
into payment of any debt claimed within reason rather than have
it cut out."3 1 Moreover, as in the marriage cases, there is a unique
relationship since there is no one else to turn to for immediate relief if a public service company breaches.3 2 These factors in the
relationship again coalesce, placing the promisee in a vulnerable
position. The courts guard against a monopoly taking advantage of
its customers' dependency by ruthlessly cutting them off from services so as to inflict more than regular contract damages, by allowing exemplary awards in the public service cases.3 s They do so
because the resulting harm is more than the loss of a commercial
bargain; To use the words of Justice De Graffenried in Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Keiley:34 "The water service which was
denied by appellant to appellee was of importance to him, and its
denial, according to his testimony, put him and his family to in26 Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Keiley, 2 Ala. App. 629, 56 So. 838 (1911).
27 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 42 So. 349 (1906).
28 Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd,

123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934).
29 Jeffersonville R.R. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116 (1871).
30 E.g., Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927) (bank checking account).
31 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 263, 42 So. 349, 351 (1906). See
also Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 526, 533 (1858). Interestingly, the Cumberland quote could be applied to a duress case. In Cumberland, where plaintiff customer did
not pay an amount due under a separate contract for a telephone in a different building for
which his wife only was liable, the telephone company cut off plaintiff's telephone service.
See notes 73-84 & accompanying text infra, for an analysis of the doctrine of duress.
22 Certain commentators and courts refer to this as a "monopolistic position." See 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 444; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 224; Wyman, The Law of the
Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem (pt. II), 17 HARV. L. REv. 217 (1904);
Note, supra note 2, at 678. As explained by the court in Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 42 So. 349 (1906):
It is a public service corporation without competition, monopolistic in nature,
and the patrons have no choice but to accept its service, and they have not the
privilege of selecting to do business with a competitor because there is no competitor, and for this reason the rights of the public should be carefully guarded
against oppressive methods ....
Id. at 263, 42 So. at 351.
11 "Legal rules governing the common callings were shaped by the need to protect the
public against exploitation or oppression by the providers of important services." Sullivan,
supra note 4, at 224.
" 2 Ala. App. 629, 56 So. 838 (1911).

1980]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

convenience, hardship, and expense. '3 5 The action, like the marriage cases, is said to "sound in tort.""6
Thus, punitive damages are awarded when the promisor uses its
leverage-acquired because of the essential nature of the services
and the uniqueness of the relationship-in an oppressive manner
to cause harm which consists of more than immediate monetary
damages. Such behavior is contrary to the public interest and punitive damages are justified as a means of discouraging parties in
the future from engaging in similar misconduct.
THE

Vernon RULE: A FALSE IMPRESSION OF CHANGE

In Indiana, the courts continued for many years to require the
showing of an independent tort before awarding punitive damages 37 outside the realm of the marriage and public service company cases. 38 However, Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Sharp3 9 held that an independent tort need not always be found
before an award of punitive damages. 40 The Indiana Supreme
Court explained that exemplary relief will be allowed in contract
cases if the conduct is "tortious in nature" and if it appears "that
15 Id. at 639, 56 So. at 841. See also Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252,
263, 42 So. 349, 351 (1906).
-1 E.g., Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931), aff'd, 123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934).
37 See, e.g., Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savage, 156 Ind. App. 283, 296 N.E.2d 165 (1973);
Standard Land Corp. v. Bogardus, 154 Ind. App. 283, 289 N.E.2d 803 (1972); Capitol Dodge,
Inc. v. Haley, 154 Ind. App. 1, 288 N.E.2d 766 (1972); Voekel v. Berry, 139 Ind. App. 267,
218 N.E.2d 924 (1966); Hedworth v. Chapman, 135 Ind. App. 129, 192 N.E.2d 649 (1963). A
typical example was Murphy Auto Sales, Inc. v. Coomer, 123 Ind. App. 709, 112 N.E.2d 589
(1953), an action by a minor and his mother to recover damages for breach of an automobile
sales contract, where the automobile was falsely represented by the defendant to be in good
condition at the time of the sale. In addition to holding that there was a breach of contract,
an award of punitive damages was affirmed by the court of appeals because there was also a
finding of gross fraud. Id. at 717-18, 112 N.E.2d at 592-93. The court was careful to state
that, as a general rule, punitive damages were to be awarded only upon the showing of a tort
committed independently of the breach of contract. Id. at 717, 112 N.E.2d at 592.
In Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d 92 (1972),
the Second District Court of Appeals indicated that it would be receptive to the idea of
eliminating the tort requirement. Note, supra note 2, at 682.
8 In a few other states there was another minor, early exception to the general rule. Some
courts intimated that if the condition of a bond given in accordance with statutory mandate
was broken, punitive damages would be recoverable. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 81, at
291; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1340, at 213-14.
" 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976). Here, the plaintiff attempted to collect proceeds
under a fire insurance policy covering certain property located at his creosoting plant which
had been virtually destroyed by fire. The insurers made no attempt to settle the claim.
10 Id. at 608-09, 349 N.E.2d at 180-81.
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the public interest will be served by the deterrent effect punitive
damages will have upon future conduct of the wrongdoer and parties similarly situated."' 4 ' Both the court of appeals 42 and the su-

preme court4" emphasized that the plaintiff repeatedly had informed the insurer that he was in desperate and immediate need of
the insurance proceeds to satisfy pressing financial matters caused
by the loss of his business in a fire and that the insurer made no
offer to settle between the time of the loss and the trial two years
later. Such conduct was characterized by the supreme court as
"oppressive 44 and contrary to the public interest.45
Vernon's approach to an oppressive insurance contract breach
recognizes that the type of misconduct present under the traditional exceptions occurred in that case. Insurance has become an
essential service for most people.46 It is similar in many ways to
services provided by public service companies. Proceeds from a
policy provide the means to stay warm, to eat, to receive medical
assistance, and to continue to subsist when one can no longer work.
Moreover, this aid comes at a time when it is most needed-when
a spouse has died; when a business is destroyed; when someone is
injured in an accident. Insurance is also similar to marriage
promises. It fulfills a basic human need; provides security and freedom from fear of being left alone; replaces the income that a deceased or disabled spouse once provided; and helps to replace destroyed or stolen property upon which rests a great deal of
emotional dependency.
Adding to the insured's dependency is the fact that he often has
nowhere else to turn for immediate relief in the event of a breach
by the insurer. Medical and casualty losses lead to expenses which
the insured frequently cannot cover with other funds. This dilemma is analogous to that of the abandoned fiance or the person
who is cut off from a public utility. In Vernon, the insurer made no
offer to settle between the time of the loss and the trial two years
later. 47 The "relief" the plaintiff-insured received in the courtroom
was certainly not immediate.
The insured's dependency makes him vulnerable to exploitation.
1

Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180 (emphasis omitted).

41

161 Ind. App. 413, 417, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1974), rev'd and remanded on other

grounds, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976).
264 Ind. at 610-11, 349 N.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 615, 349 N.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 615-16, 349 N.E.2d at 185.
46 See generally cases cited notes 60-62 infra.
Id. at 610-11, 349 N.E.2d at 181.
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Since the insurer receives premiums before its obligation arises, it
will lose little, compared to the insured, by deferring payment until
forced to do so by an adverse judgment. The insured has no real
power to influence the insurer's decision not to pay immediately.
Insurance companies are aware that people coming to them for
proceeds on their policies usually have been through a trying experience, have suffered a loss and are at the company's mercy. In the
same way that the promisors in the marriage cases exploited their
flances' vulnerability by ruthlessly cutting off the engagements,
and the public service companies by cutting off their customers'
services, the insurer in Vernon intentionally used its leverage to
harm the insured in refusing to attempt to settle the claim. 48
The harm that results from such an oppressive contract breach
by an insurance company consists of something more than immediate monetary damages. The insured's loss consists not only of regular contract damages, for like the betrayed fiance and abandoned
public utility customer, there is also a loss of security and of peace
of mind. More remote expenses are also incurred since relief must
be postponed until a court judgment can be obtained.4 9
Thus, the overall misconduct, which Vernon called "tortious in
nature,"5 0 amounts to something more than a regular contract
breach. Marriage cases note harm similar to those injuries commonly labeled "torts ' 51 and public service cases find harms which
"'sound in tort."5 2 This similarity in language and reasoning cannot
be ignored, for though this misconduct is not a tort per se, the
public has an interest in preventing comparable behavior in the
future. Vernon made this public interest a part of the damages
test, 53 which-indicates a recognition that these cases are not regular
'8In its discussion of the suitability of an award of punitive damages in view of such
misconduct, the Vernon court was careful to emphasize however, that the parties must be
"permitted to dispute ... liability in good faith because of the prohibitive social costs of a
rule which would make claims nondisputable." Id. at 609-10, 349 N.E.2d at 181.
19 In Vernon, the insurers knew that plaintiff desired to rebuild his business, but could
not do so without the insurance proceeds, and that plaintiff continued to incur the expense
of a monthly rental of $300 for the plant site in anticipation of rebuilding. Id. at 610, 349
N.E.2d at 181.
50 Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.
' 5 A. CORBIN,supra note 8, § 1077, at 442; see, e.g., Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549,
549 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Brown v. Douglas, 104 Ga. App. 769, 769, 122 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1961);
Baumle v. Verde, 33 Okla. 243, 247, 124 P. 1083, 1084 (1912).
52 See, e.g., Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Keiley, 2 Ala. App. 629, 639, 56 So. 838, 841
(1911); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 263, 42 So. 341, 351 (1858);
Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd,
123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934).
53 264 Ind. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:563

contract breaches, but rather lie in the gray area between contract
and tort law.
Thus, an award of punitive damages in Vernon does not represent a departure from the traditional cases awarding punitive
damages. The significant factors in Vernon are also present in the
cases involving the breach of promise to marry and the breach by
public service companies: a dependent relationship due to the essential nature of the services contracted for and the uniqueness of
the relationship; oppressive behavior on the part of the breaching
party as a result of it taking advantage of the special relationship;
and harm which is something more than pecuniary and which is
longlasting. All of this adds up to misconduct which is "tortious in
nature" and which the public has an interest in deterring in the
future-the only requisites for an award of punitive damages."'
The existence of an independent tort is unimportant.
THE RULE IN CALIFORNIA-A DIFFERENT APPROACH

Like Indiana, California has awarded extra damages in contract
cases 55 where an insurer fails to accept a reasonable settlement5 6 or
unreason ably and in bad faith withholds benefits owed under a
policy.5 California, however, labels such misconduct a tort per se,
58
notwithstanding that it may also constitute a breach of contract;
thus an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of
insurance companies with regard to their performance of insurance
contracts is enforced.5 9
Labeling the behavior a tort enables the California courts to
avoid an accusation of modifying the traditional punitive damage
CORBIN, supra note 8, § 1077, at 438; W. PROSSER, supra note 9.
Note, Jarchow v. TransamericaTitle Insurance Company: A Trend Toward Strict Liability for Emotional Distress in the Insurance Industry, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 591 (1976).
*1 See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429-33, 426 P.2d 173, 176-77, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658-60, 328
P.2d 198, 201-02 (1958).
57 See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037-38, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 486 (1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
" See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78,
93 (1970) (where insurance company unreasonably and in bad faith withheld benefits owed
under a policy); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967) (where insurance company failed to accept reasonable settlement).
59 See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 716-17 (1974); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658-59,
328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (1958).
54
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rule. Regardless of the label applied, be it an oppressive breach of
contract or a breach of an implied duty to act in good faith and to
deal fairly, the California courts justify this special treatment of
insurance contracts on policy grounds which are analogous to the
factors present in the public service and marriage contract cases.
The courts explain that the bases for the extra damage awards
are "the reasonable expectation of the public and the type of service which the entity holds itself out as ready to offer,"' 0 that the
special relationship and duties of the insurer exist in recognition of
the fact that the insured does not contract
to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect herself against
the risks of accidental losses, including the mental distress
which might follow from the losses. Among the considerations
in purchasing ... insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the
peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of an

accidental loss . .

..

California courts also emphasize that the insured's position is
further weakened since he will not be able to obtain relief elsewhere if the company refuses to perform:
Plaintiff's application, filed shortly before the accident, indicated that he had no other hospital or disability insurance and,
indeed, the manager of defendant's claims department testified
that the policy would not have been issued if plaintiff had
other hospital insurance. Defendant was aware that plaintiff
earned only a modest income and had incurred substantial
medical and hospital bills. The company also knew that there
was a serious question whether plaintiff would qualify for
workmen's compensation benefits, and that the compensation
carrier had consistently denied coverage on the ground 0that
2
plaintiff was not an employee at the time of the accident.
It is this dependent nature of the insurance relationship which
justifies the imposition of special duties on insurance companies
with respect to their handling of insurance claims,6 3 for "the very
risks insured against presuppose that if and when a claim is made,
80 Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456 P.2d 674, 682, 79
Cal. Rptr. 106, 114 (1969).
'I Crisci v. Security Ins, Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19
(1967); see Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 278, 419 P.2d 168, 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
113 (1966).
62Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 461, 521 P.2d 1103, 1109, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 717 (1974).
63 Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456 P.2d 674, 681-82, 79
Cal. Rptr. 106, 113-14 (1969).
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the insured will be disabled and in strait financial circumstances
and, therefore, particularly vulnerable to oppressive tactics on the
part of an economically powerful entity. 6 4 Therefore, where an in-

surer fails to accept a reasonable settlement or unreasonably and
in bad faith withholds benefits owed under a policy, and does so in
an oppressive, fraudulent or malicious manner, thereby taking advantage of the dependent relationship it has entered into with the
insured so as to inflict something more than immediate commercial
harm upon him, 5 it will be liable for punitive damages in
California. 6

This is identical to misconduct Indiana treats as appropriate for
punitive damages under the Vernon oppressive-breach rule. Yet in
California "[i]t is well settled that punitive damages may not be
recovered for a breach of contract, even if the breach is willful,
fraudulent or coupled with evil intent.

'67

While the California

courts purport to be rejecting the Vernon rule, they do precisely
the same thing it does under a different label.6 8
Regardless of what it is called, be it an exception to the traditional punitive damages rule,6 9 a breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, ° or a breach, tortious in nature, which
does not fit the confines of a predetermined tort,71 the misconduct
is always the same. Its features should be recognized so that results
" Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970).
65 Note that in California, the misconduct that will support a punitive damage award will
be labeled a "tort" consisting of either intentional infliction of emotional distress or interference with a protected property interest in the insurance proceeds. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 93-94.
66 Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
Id. at 400, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
68 It is a California court, however, which has noted that "Itihe label is not important."
Barerra v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668, 456 P.2d 674, 681, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 106, 113 (1969). In Barerra the court, as in Vernon, emphasized that the insurance
business is affected with a public interest in offering services of a quasi-public nature, id. at
669, 456 P.2d at 680-81, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13, and it further noted that "'it is not vastly
important that the legal relationship be placed in a particular category,'" id. at 668, 456
P.2d at 681 n.6, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 113 n.6 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kukuska v. Home
Mut. Hail Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 169, 235 N.W.403, 405 (1931)), since " '[wihether
this duty be called one of tort or of quasi-contract is immaterial,'" id. n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 U. PA. L.
REv. 207, 224 (1927)).
69 See notes 14-15 & accompanying text supra.
70 Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 716-17 (1974); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658-59, 328
P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
71 Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976).
7
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will be more consistent and reasoning more logical. 7 2
A CAMOUFLAGED SOURCE OF THE Vernon RULE: THE
DOCTRINE OF DURESS

In the doctrine of duress there exists a public policy of preventing misconduct similar to the marriage, public service and insurance cases. Under the Vernon rule, courts may require the defendant to pay more than regular contract damages whenever there is
a contract breach plus wrongful conduct which the public has an
interest in preventing, even though such conduct does not constitute an independent tort.73 In the duress cases, rescission is allowable whenever there is a threat of a breach plus wrongful conduct
which the public has an interest in preventing, even though the
threatened act is not independently wrongful.74 The only difference between the two types of cases is that in the Vernon situation
there is an actual breach while in the duress situation there is only
the threat of a breach.
Under the doctrine of duress, if a promisee has an immediate
need for the promised goods or services and is unable to obtain
them from another source, a threat by a promisor to withhold performance until the promisee gives in to the promisor's unjust demands may be treated as duress justifying rescission of the coerced
agreement. 5 Although in the duress situation the promisor does
not actually withdraw from the relationship but only threatens to
do so, it is still analogous to the Vernon misconduct since the
promisee's harm is a direct result of a dependent relationship
The courts sometimes achieve a similar resuli by abusing the fraud or conversion test
in an attempt to find the elements of an independent tort where there is no real evidence of
one. See, e.g., Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d 92
(1972), a case arising four years before Vernon where "it is not clear whether the court of
appeals' decision was based upon a finding of a technical tort of conversion, some variation
of fraud, or simply an oppressive breach of contract." Note, supra note 2, at 682.
Compare Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 72,
307 P.2d 626 (1957) with Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968). Although both cases involved the same fact pattern, the Contractor's
court chose to refer to the fraudulent inducement in the case as a "fraudulent breach" while
the Wetherbee court in effect found a fraudulent inducement but decided the facts before it
presented a "fraud," thereby warranting exemplary damages. Note, Exemplary Damages in
Contract Cases, 7 WILLAMETE L.J. 137, 141-43 (1971).
Clarification of the rule would be beneficial to insureds and insurers alike in that it
would enable them to predict the results of their relationship.
73 See generally notes 37-54 & accompanying text supra.
74 2 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 9.3 (1978).
75 Id. § 9.12, at 314-15.
72
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which the promisor intentionally uses to his advantage to cause
harm to the promisee. 6
Notably, the courts have emphasized that the services or goods
to be withheld are essential by their nature 7 and that there is a
special, immediate and pressing need for them which increases
the dependent nature of the relationship. Moreover, as in Vernon,
whether the promisee has a reasonable alternative which could
produce prompt and adequate relief in the event of a breach is an
important factor in determining whether the promisee is in a vulnerable position.7 9
Once the promisor exerts leverage, acquired because of the dependent nature of the relationship, so as to cause harm to the
promisee, he has coerced the promisee in such a way as to constitute duress justifying rescission of the oppressive settlement or recovery of the excessive amount paid to the oppressive party." To
" The courts have given this special treatment to marital, public service and insurance
relationships: where a husband has threatened to abandon his wife and three small children
if she did not mortgage her separate property to secure his creditor, see Line v. Blizzard, 70
Ind. 23 (1880); where a public utility has threatened to turn off services to procure payments
in excess of authorized rates, see Carol City Util., Inc. v. Miami Gardens Shopping Plaza,
Inc., 165 So.2d 199 (Fla. App. 1964) (water and sewer connections); Barry v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 374 Ill. 473, 29 N.E.2d 1014 (1940) (electricity); Saginaw v. Consumers Power
Co., 304 Mich. 491, 8 N.W.2d 149 (1943) (gas); and where an insurance company has
threatened to cancel a life insurance policy (providing for waiver of premiums during total
and permanent disability) unless the insured, who contended disability, continued making
payments, see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, 72 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1934); Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. McCaskill, 126 Fla. 82, 170 So. 579 (1936); Wenstrom v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
55 N.D. 647, 215 N.W. 93 (1927); Still v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 165 Tenn. 224, 54
S.W.2d 947 (1932).
" See, e.g., B & B Amusement Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Boston, 297 Mass. 307, 308, 8
N.E.2d 788, 789 (1937), where the court said:
Nor do we think that in a case of this kind the plaintiff need show the purposes for which it wanted the water or the importance or necessity of having it.
It is enough that the plaintiff had an immediate right to the water and would
have been deprived of that right if it had not submitted to the unlawful
exaction.
78 2 G. PALMER, supra note 74, § 9.12, at 316.
79 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 8, § 9-2, at 262; 2 G. PALMER, supra note 74, §
9.5. See, e.g., Gallagher Switchboard Corp. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 34 Misc. 2d 256, 229
N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
so Normally, the remedy for duress is in the nature of a quasi-contractual action
for money had and received. Because the principal economic function of duress
has been to redress unjust enrichment, the normal recovery is the amount paid
to the party to the extent the payment exceeds what was fairly owed.
J. CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 8, § 9-9, at 272; see Dawson, Economic Duress-An
Essay in Perspective, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 253, 283-85 (1947). "Duress may also be raised by
way of an affirmative defense to an action on the executory portion of the agreement." J.
CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 8, § 9-9, at 272. An example would be where an oppressed insured "settles" in a one-sided agreement.
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constitute duress, there need not even be a breach, but only wrongful conduct. To constitute a punitive damages case against an insurance company, however, there must be the wrongful conduct
plus a breach of contract.
Since there is an actual contract breach in one case but not the
other, the nature of the harm in the two situations is different. In
the duress situation, the promisee, by giving in to the promisor's
demands, prevents the threatened breach; he can then seek the aid
of the courts to abrogate the unfair agreement and enforce his
original rights. In Vernon, however, the insurer breached the contract instead of making an attempt to negotiate.8 1 Moreover, the
insurers refused to pay the insured the amount they conceded he
was entitled to.82 Although his needs were immediate they abruptly and entirely cut off the insured from the relationship. In the
duress case, since the promisee agrees to accept a lesser settlement
than the original contract calls for, rescission of that settlement is
a logical remedy. In the breach-of-contract situation, where the
threatened breach is not avoided, the resulting harm may be more
drastic. In Vernon, even a one-sided or partial settlement might
have started the insured back on his way again. Instead, he had to
wait two years to get any of the money he was entitled to. In the
meantime he was paying rent simply to retain his demolished business site.8 3 He was unable to get the insurer to make any offer at
84

all.
Thus, a promisor in the Vernon situation who chooses to make
no offer at all, who gives the promisee no chance to escape the
harm (as opposed to one who at least makes a one-sided settlement
giving the promisee a way out) not only is able to draw income
with the money it would have paid in a settlement, but also causes
more harm to the promisee. In spite of the additional harm which
often results in such a situation, jurisdictions not allowing the imposition of any extra damages encourage promisors not to make
settlement attempts, and at the same time give harmed promisees
a lesser remedy. Obviously the promisor's conduct is just as wrongful, if not more so, in the case where the promisee is not given a
chance to escape the harm as in the case where he is given a way
out. Although the wrongful behavior in the two cases is almost
identical, in the case where the defendant has gone ahead and
SI

264 Ind. at 610-12, 349 N.E.2d at 181-82.

82 Id. at 611, 349 N.E.2d at 181.
'3 Id. at 610, 349 N.E.2d at 181.
P1 Id.
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breached a contract, there can be no rescission remedy, for there is
no contract to rescind. Consequently, if the defendant is to be required by the courts to do something other than pay regular contract damages it must be done under a different label, namely "punitive damages," which unlike the duress doctrine, has been
subjected to the independent tort requirement.
It makes no sense to make the defendant pay damages in one
case but not the other simply because of the different labels applied. The Vernon court finally recognized that regardless of the
absence of an independent tort, the public has an interest in
preventing oppressive conduct where traditional contract damages
already are being awarded. That interest is demonstrated by the
doctrine of duress.
CONCLUSION

The allowance in Indiana of punitive damages in contract actions against insurance companies where there is no independent
tort does not represent a modification of existing law. Instead, it
signifies that the courts are working to preserve traditional policies
and the public interest.
Those public policies and interests can be found in some of the
traditional exceptions to the punitive damage rule: the breach of
promise to marry and the breach by a public service company; in
the California tort of bad faith and unfair dealing; and in the doctrine of duress.
In all of these cases, more than a commercial bargain is at stake;
the relationship between the parties is unique and of a quasi-public nature. There is an important public interest impressed upon
these contracts which requires that the promisor who enters into
such a crucial relationship make a nonoppressive attempt to do
what he has promised. The Vernon court has recognized that the
insurance contract falls into this category.
This is not a new idea. It is not a grave departure from traditional case law. The principle merely has been hidden behind the
various labels discussed here. The Indiana approach is a refreshingly clear and sound solution to a familiar type of problem which
will continue to surface in a variety of contexts. Hopefully, the
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courts will appreciate fully its utility in their attempts to determine whether there is a public interest in preventing an oppressive
breach of certain types of "private" contracts.
SUSAN MARGUET

